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ABSTRACT—Today, many federal court cases are resolved by means of a 
settlement agreement. When a dispute arises regarding the formation, 
interpretation, and enforcement of those settlement agreements, a federal 
judge must resolve whether state or federal law governs the enforcement 
proceeding. Given the current lack of clarity in this area, this Article 
advocates for uniform federal choice of law principles in settlement 
enforcement proceedings where a federal question is involved. The federal 
courts have an institutional interest in creating uniform rules to govern the 
behavior in the courts. Uniformity in settlement enforcement proceedings 
would be consistent with the independent and self-regulating nature of the 
courts. Additionally, there is a strong federal interest in promoting the 
settlement of federal lawsuits and enforcing valid settlements. There may 
also be some federal statute-specific policies that require the use of federal 
common law when the underlying claims in a settlement are based on that 
statute. Part I of the Article discusses relevant Supreme Court case law and 
illustrates the confusion amongst the circuits. Part II argues that the federal 
courts have an institutional interest in governing their own affairs sufficient 
to support the application of federal common law of settlements. Part II 
describes the identifiable federal policy in favor of settlements. The Article 
ultimately proposes that the development of a uniform federal common law 
on settlement enforcement would address the current situation. 
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Currently, slightly over one percent of civil cases in the federal courts 
go to trial.1 While some cases are dismissed or disposed of at the motion to 
dismiss or summary judgment stage, a large number are resolved by means 
of a settlement agreement. From time to time, disputes arise between parties 
regarding the formation, interpretation, and enforcement of those settlement 
agreements.2 These disputes can raise a variety of legal and factual issues 
that require a ruling by the courts. The first of these issues is whether the 
federal court has jurisdiction over the dispute.3 Assuming the federal court 
 
1  JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 172 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf (detailing that of the 309,361 
civil cases in federal courts that were terminated during a twelve-month period ending in 2010, only 
1.1% of them were terminated by trial); see also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of 
Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004) 
(“The portion of federal civil cases resolved by trial fell . . . to 1.8 percent in 2002 . . . .”). 
2  A Lexis search performed in January 2012 for opinions published by Illinois federal courts in 
2011 addressing conflicts of the validity, enforcement, or effect of settlement agreements returned fifty-
three results, thirty-eight of which were directly relevant to this Article. The search was performed in the 
“IL Federal District Courts” database, and the search terms were: “settlement /s enforce! and date 
geq(1/1/11) and date leq(12/31/11).” 
3  See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994) (explaining that a 
federal district court can retain jurisdiction over a settlement agreement by incorporating the terms of the 
settlement in the dismissal order or by expressly retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement in the 
dismissal order). But see Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2002), where the 
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has jurisdiction, the next question a judge must resolve—and the focus of 
this Article—is whether state or federal law governs the settlement 
enforcement proceeding.4 Despite being such a basic issue, the Supreme 
Court has not addressed it, the circuits are split on the answer, and the case 
law fails to employ any meaningful analytical framework. Given the 
pervasive nature of settlements in the federal courts, uniform federal choice 
of law principles in settlement enforcement proceedings would assist the 
parties and the federal courts when disputes arise. 
This Article addresses the choice of law issue in settlement 
enforcement proceedings. A settlement enforcement proceeding can arise 
from a federal case in which the basis of federal jurisdiction was federal 
question jurisdiction, diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, or a combination 
of federal question claims and supplementary state law claims. This Article 
focuses on all cases brought on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, 
including those that have supplementary state law claims.5 For such cases, 
there is a threshold issue of whether federal or state law governs a 
settlement enforcement proceeding. 
Where the underlying claim is based on federal question jurisdiction, 
the current state of the law is unclear as to whether federal or state law 
controls a settlement enforcement proceeding. There are no statutes or 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that address this issue; it is a matter of 
federal choice of law. The circuits, however, are split as to the proper 
approach.6 Additionally, the circuits provide very little analysis as to why 
they choose to apply either federal or state law.7 Supreme Court doctrine on 
federal common law is conceptually difficult and most circuits generally 
 
Seventh Circuit held that a district court’s statement retaining jurisdiction over a settlement agreement 
was irrelevant to whether it actually retained jurisdiction, a statement that was inconsistent with the 
holding in Kokkonen. See Morton Denlow, Federal Jurisdiction in the Enforcement of Settlement 
Agreements: Kokkonen Revisited, 1 FED. CTS. L. REV. 345, 357–58 (2006). 
4  This Article uses the term “settlement enforcement proceeding” as a catchall for any context 
where a party seeks to enforce a settlement agreement, be it via motion when the original action is still 
before the federal court or a separate enforcement action after the original suit has been dismissed. 
When the context in which the enforcement proceeding arises changes the analysis, it will be noted. 
5  The question of what law should apply in diversity cases is beyond the scope of this Article. In a 
case brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, the federal court is to apply state law. Thus, 
there is a stronger argument that the law of the state under which the case would otherwise be decided 
should govern any settlement disputes, as opposed to cases in which federal law would otherwise 
govern. This Article does not take a position on what law should apply to settlement enforcement 
disputes in diversity cases, but acknowledges that a different analysis would be required. 
6  See, e.g., Chaganti & Assocs., P.C. v. Nowotny, 470 F.3d 1215, 1221 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying 
state contract law to resolve a motion to enforce a settlement revolving around the issue of whether a 
valid settlement agreement existed); Pereira v. Sonia Holdings, Ltd. (In re Artha Mgmt., Inc.), 91 F.3d 
326, 329 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that federal contract law governs the enforcement proceeding, 
specifically the scope of an agent’s authority to bind a party to a settlement). 
7  See, e.g., Mich. Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. New Century Bancorp, Inc., 99 F. App’x 15, 21 
(6th Cir. 2004) (stating, without explanation, that Michigan contract law governed the validity of a 
settlement agreement where the original complaint alleged a federal securities law violation). 
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avoid the issue. When the circuits do provide an analysis, they usually 
ignore the relevant Supreme Court precedent8 and cite cases that are 
similarly deficient in reasoning.9 
Settlements resolving federal question cases can involve any number of 
parties. As the number of parties increases, the possibility of disputes 
arising from the settlement process can also multiply. These settlements are 
reached in a variety of forums—in front of a judge, in private mediation, or 
in direct negotiations between the parties. Each path to settlement is 
common and may raise particular issues in enforcement disputes. It is not 
unusual for a federal question case pending in one state to involve out-of-
state parties and be settled by a mediator in another jurisdiction. Across-the-
board application of state law is problematic on a practical level because it 
can raise a host of choice of law questions, such as: (1) where the case is 
brought, (2) where the settlement is made, (3) how to handle settlements of 
international disputes and litigation between states, and (4) what to do if the 
federal government is a party. These choice of law issues simply complicate 
matters. With the increasing prevalence of settlement agreements as the 
means of resolving federal cases, it is time the circuits and, ultimately, the 
Supreme Court, reexamine this important issue to provide clarity and reason 
to the choice of law in settlement enforcement proceedings. 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this particular subject, 
several cases provide a general framework for determining whether federal 
common law should apply to an issue. Modern Supreme Court doctrine is 
skeptical of federal common law as the source of rules of decision.10 As a 
result, the Court restricts its application to a very limited number of 
contexts where uniquely federal interests are implicated or Congress 
otherwise authorizes the use of federal common law.11 A precondition for 
the use of federal common law is that there must be a “significant conflict” 
between the use of a state law rule of decision and the federal policy or 
interest at stake.12 
 
8  See, e.g., Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 220 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that federal law 
controls settlement enforcement proceedings where the underlying claim is brought pursuant to a federal 
statute without citing to or analyzing the issues made relevant by Supreme Court cases related to federal 
common law, such as Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997)). 
9  See, e.g., United States v. McCall, 235 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that New 
Mexico state law controls the enforceability of settlements, but citing Carr v. Runyan, 89 F.3d 327, 331 
(7th Cir. 1996), which traces back to case law that actually applied federal law to a settlement 
enforcement dispute); see also infra note 163 (detailing the authorities implicated by McCall). 
10  See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Ultimate Independence of the Federal Courts: Defying the 
Supreme Court in the Exercise of Federal Common Law Powers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 425, 453 (2004). 
11  See generally id. at 434–53 (discussing the state of modern Supreme Court federal common law 
doctrine). 
12  See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218; O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1994); Kamen 
v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991). 
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Despite these general principles, there are a number of issues that 
remain unclear in application. Primary among these is the scope of the 
prerequisite “uniquely federal interest” sufficient to justify the creation of 
federal common law. The Supreme Court has at times emphasized the very 
limited nature of this category,13 while expanding it at other times.14 Also 
among the gray areas are the contours of the significant conflict analysis. In 
particular, when does a conflict between a federal interest or policy and the 
use of state law become sufficiently significant to justify the use of federal 
common law rather than state law as a rule of decision? And what factors 
should a court consider when conducting this conflict analysis? 
Ultimately, federal common law should provide the rules of decision 
for settlement enforcement proceedings where the underlying claim is based 
on federal question jurisdiction. The federal courts have an institutional 
interest in creating uniform rules to govern behavior in the courts. Such 
uniformity would preserve the independence of the courts and conform to 
their self-regulating nature. Additionally, there is a separate, yet strong, 
federal interest in promoting the settlement of federal lawsuits and 
enforcing valid settlements that supports a federal common law of 
settlements.15 Varying state law contract principles have the potential to 
undermine the settlement process. When such a rule creates a significant 
conflict with the federal policy of promoting settlements, the displacement 
of state contract law in favor of federal common law is justified and 
appropriate.16 Lastly, there may be even more federal statute-specific 
policies that require the use of federal common law when the underlying 
claims in a settlement are based on that statute. 
Of course, leaving this choice of law issue up to the federal courts is 
not the only way of handling the problem. The parties to a settlement could 
always include a clause in their agreement specifying the choice of law in 
the event a dispute should arise. Congress could also pass a statute 
resolving this issue for all federal question claims.17 Additionally, the Rules 
Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States could suggest to 
the Supreme Court one or more Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to govern 
the settlement process.18 But assuming none of these actions are taken, 
resolving this problem remains in the hands of the federal courts. 
 
13  See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981). 
14  See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–06 (1988). 
15  See, e.g.¸ GET, LLC v. City of Blackwell, 407 F. App’x 307, 318 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting a 
federal policy in favor of settlement in federal courts); Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1369 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (same). 
16  See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218. 
17  An even less likely resolution of this issue would come if Congress specified in any given statute 
whether federal or state law should govern any settlements of claims brought under that statute. 
18  The issues of whether this action would be valid under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2071–2077 (2006), and whether the Rules Committee would be likely to take such action are outside 
the scope of this Article, but would be an interesting topic for further discussion. 
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This choice of law problem is relevant for the day-to-day settlement of 
federal litigation. Part I will first discuss the relevant Supreme Court case 
law and then illustrate how the circuits have generally misunderstood the 
proper issues informing the choice of law analysis under these cases. Part II 
will first argue that the federal courts have an institutional interest in 
governing their own affairs sufficient to support the federal common law of 
settlements. Then, Part II will describe the other federal interests that 
support the use of federal common law in settlement enforcement 
proceedings on a more limited basis. The identifiable federal policy in favor 
of settlements of federal claims, as well as statute-specific policies, support 
the use of federal common law. Part II will explore various arguments as to 
why federal common law should control the enforcement of settlements of 
federal claims when these other interests and policies are implicated. 
I. THE EXISTING ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Supreme Court has not addressed the choice of law issue in a 
settlement enforcement proceeding arising out of federal question claims. 
There are, however, several analogous Supreme Court decisions that 
provide a general framework for understanding when a court should 
consider creating federal common law. Additionally, the subject implicates 
complicated issues of federalism and federal policy, issues the circuits 
generally avoid discussing. As a result, the circuits are split on whether 
state or federal law should control. Ultimately, most circuits resolve the 
issue without much analysis, so it is difficult to synthesize the different 
positions. To many circuits, the question is settled despite the fact that the 
Supreme Court has significantly altered its approach to federal common law 
over the last thirty years. This Part will first examine the relevant Supreme 
Court case law. A discussion of the state of the circuit court case law 
follows. 
A. The Presumption Against Federal Common Law 
Ever since the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins, the federal courts have been on notice that “[t]here is no federal 
general common law.”19 The exceptions to this general rule under Erie are 
“in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress.”20 
The Supreme Court’s position on federal common law has varied since 
Erie. The Court has, in fact, created federal common law in areas outside of 
constitutional or statutory interpretation21 and recognized certain areas 
 
19  304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
20  Id. 
21  See generally Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218 (describing the existence of “‘federal common law’ in 
the strictest sense, i.e., a rule of decision that amounts, not simply to an interpretation of a federal statute 
or a properly promulgated administrative rule, but, rather, to the judicial ‘creation’ of a special federal 
rule of decision”). 
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appropriate for federal common law.22 It applied federal common law to the 
validity of releases under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA),23 
only to restrict it thirty years later to two limited situations: where Congress 
has conferred power on the courts via statute to develop substantive law and 
where a federal rule is necessary to protect a uniquely federal interest.24 The 
Court also elaborated on the analysis a court must engage in before 
displacing state law with federal common law.25 More recently, the 
Supreme Court again restricted federal common law,26 though the doctrine 
is far from clear.27 This line of Supreme Court case law on federal common 
law, beginning with Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad, 
illustrates how the presumption against federal common law has evolved. 
In Dice, the Supreme Court considered whether federal or state law 
controls the question of whether a document signed by the plaintiff prior to 
filing his lawsuit was a valid release of his claims under FELA.28 In 
concluding that federal law must determine the validity of releases under 
FELA, the Court noted that it was Congress who granted the right to sue 
and stated that “[s]tate laws are not controlling in determining what the 
incidents of this federal right [to recover against an employer for 
negligence] shall be.”29 The Court further reasoned that the federal rights 
protected by FELA could be easily defeated if individual states could 
determine the available defenses to claims brought under the statute.30 
Additionally, the Court considered the uniform application of the statute to 
be essential to effectuating its purposes and saw the use of federal law as 
the way to achieve such uniformity.31 Releases play an important part in the 
administration of a federal act, the Court explained, so their validity must 
be determined according to uniform federal law.32 The sweeping language 
and reasoning in Dice are characteristic of the period prior to the 1980s that 
 
22  See Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 905–14 (1996). 
23  Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952). 
24  Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). 
25  Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–13 (1988). 
26  See, e.g., Atherton, 519 U.S. at 220–21 (holding that no federal interest was at stake because the 
various state laws had not prevented the banking industry from thriving); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 
512 U.S. 79, 88–89 (1994) (rejecting the argument that a uniform standard was needed where the issue 
would not govern the conduct of the United States and rejecting the argument that there was a federal 
interest in not allowing states to insulate attorneys from malpractice liability). 
27  See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507–09 (2001) (holding that 
federal common law controls the claim preclusive effect in state courts of judgments in federal question 
cases in federal court, but not elaborating on principles of federal common law). 
28  Dice, 342 U.S. at 360–61. 
29  Id. at 361. 
30  See id. 
31  See id. 
32  Id. at 361–62. 
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was more hospitable to the idea of federal common law than the present 
era.33 
Starting in 1981, the Court took a narrower view, emphasizing that the 
areas in which federal common law may be appropriately used are “few and 
restricted.”34 In Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., the 
Supreme Court began the modern trend towards limiting the use of federal 
common law by identifying specific limited categories within which federal 
common law would be justified.35 Texas Industries presented the Supreme 
Court with the question of whether a right to contribution was available to a 
defendant who had been found liable and was assessed damages under 
federal antitrust statutes.36 Since the antitrust laws did not expressly 
establish such a right, the Court proceeded to consider whether there was 
such a right as a matter of federal common law.37 
The Court started with the basic principle announced in Erie that there 
is “no federal general common law”38 and added the qualification that there 
is a need for such law in “few and restricted” instances.39 The Court 
described two essential categories where general federal common law is 
permitted: (1) where Congress has given the courts the power to develop 
substantive law via statute and (2) where “a federal rule of decision is 
‘necessary to protect uniquely federal interests.’”40 
The first category was relatively simple in application. A court only 
need analyze whether Congress intended to confer the power to create any 
common law principles to fill in any gaps in the substantive law.41 The 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is an example of a 
statute where Congress explicitly intended that the federal courts would 
develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-
regulated plans.42 Other statutes, such as the Labor Management Relations 
Act43 and the Sherman Act,44 have been read to imply congressional intent 
 
33  See Lund, supra note 22, at 905–15. 
34  Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quoting Wheeldin v. 
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)). 
35  Id. at 640. 
36  Id. at 632. 
37  Id. at 639–40. 
38  Id. at 640 (quoting Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). 
39  Id. (quoting Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 651). 
40  Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)). 
41  See generally id. at 642–44 (discussing those situations in which Congress has vested the federal 
courts with the power to create rules of law governing particular federal statutes). 
42  See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 831 (2003); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (describing congressional reports reflecting this sentiment). 
43  29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006). 
44  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
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that federal courts develop federal common law to establish the governing 
principles of law in those areas.45 
The second category, dealing with uniquely federal interests, requires 
more explanation. Areas that implicate these interests include “those 
concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate 
and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our 
relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.”46 Only these areas were 
appropriate for federal common law because in all of them either “the 
authority and duties of the United States as sovereign are intimately 
involved or because the interstate or international nature of the controversy 
makes it inappropriate for state law to control.”47 
The Court admitted that there was a federal interest in an issue 
regarding remedies under the antitrust laws in a general sense. This was 
because lawsuits brought under the Sherman Act “supplement[] federal 
enforcement and fulfill[] the objects of the statutory scheme.”48 
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that this was not the sort of “uniquely federal 
interest” requiring a federal rule of decision.49 Interestingly, the Court never 
cited or mentioned Dice or its broad language about federal law controlling 
the incidents of federal rights. In fact, the Supreme Court has never returned 
to Dice on an issue of federal common law in any subsequent case. 
Despite the clear language of Texas Industries, later Supreme Court 
cases suggest that federal common law is not so limited. In Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp.,50 the plaintiff sued a helicopter manufacturer in federal 
court on the basis of diversity, alleging that a defective helicopter door 
design caused the death of a marine pilot.51 At issue was whether military 
contractors to the government have a “military contractor defense,” 
predicated on federal law, to state law design defect product liability 
claims.52 The Court began by citing Texas Industries for the proposition that 
if there is a uniquely federal interest, courts can apply federal common 
law.53 Even though the underlying suit was a private suit between private 
parties, the Court found that the impact of such suits on the federal 
government was sufficient to implicate “uniquely federal interests.”54 The 
Court found that it was appropriate for federal common law to displace 
 
45  See Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 642–43. 
46  Id. at 641 (footnotes omitted). 
47  Id. 
48  Id. at 642. 
49  Id. 
50  487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
51  Id. at 502. 
52  Id. at 503. 
53  Id. at 504. 
54  Id. at 506–07. 
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state law by providing this “Government contractor” defense.55 Allowing 
such suits against manufacturers who provide products to the government 
pursuant to procurement contracts would have the effect of raising the price 
the company charges the government or deterring companies from 
designing government products to the provided specifications.56 In either 
case, the interests of the United States are directly affected.57 
The Court then recognized that a second level of inquiry was necessary 
before displacing state law.58 Federal common law would only control, 
despite the federal interest, where there was “a ‘significant 
conflict’ . . . between an identifiable ‘federal policy or interest and the 
[operation] of state law’ . . . or the application of state law would ‘frustrate 
specific objectives’ of federal legislation.”59 The federal interest at stake 
might justify using federal common law because of the need for national 
uniformity on a particular issue, or it might only justify the use of federal 
common law when specific rules of the states were actually in conflict with 
the federal interest.60 
The Court found the relevant federal policy embodied in the Federal 
Tort Claims Act’s discretionary function exception, whereby the federal 
government would not be liable for the conduct of employees that 
constituted the exercise of a discretionary function or duty.61 This provision 
evidenced a federal interest in limiting the costs of tort suits against the 
government when those suits would amount to second-guessing 
government decisions.62 Suing government contractors had the same effect 
as directly suing the government because the government would ultimately 
bear the cost through increased contract prices.63 The Court concluded that 
any state law that imposes design defect liability on government contractors 
providing military equipment presents a significant conflict with this federal 
interest and must be displaced.64 In so doing, the Court gave a more 
expansive interpretation of the type of uniquely federal interest necessary 
for the application of federal common law than Texas Industries did. 
The Court again discussed the appropriate reach of federal common 
law in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.,65 answering whether 
 
55  Id. at 507. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting, respectively, Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 
63, 68 (1966), and United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)). 
60  Id. at 507–08. 
61  Id. at 511. 
62  See id. at 511–12. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. at 512. 
65  500 U.S. 90 (1991). 
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federal common law should govern a universal demand requirement for 
derivative suits brought under the Investment Corporations Act (ICA).66 The 
Court found this question to be easy, holding that it was “clear that the 
contours of the demand requirement in a derivative action founded on the 
ICA are governed by federal law.”67 This was because the ICA is a federal 
statute and “any common law rule necessary to effectuate a private cause of 
action under that statute is necessarily federal in character.”68 
The Court then proceeded to a second tier of the analysis: whether state 
law should provide the content of the federal common law.69 Under this 
rule, state law provides the content of federal law except where there is a 
need for national uniformity, other analogous statutory schemes embody 
policy choices readily applicable to the issue at hand, or the state law would 
frustrate the objectives of federal programs.70 While this latter statement 
was consistent with prior case law, the Kamen Court continued on to 
announce that there is a “particularly strong” presumption that state law 
should be incorporated into federal common law “in areas in which private 
parties have entered legal relationships with the expectation that their rights 
and obligations would be governed by state-law standards.”71 The Court 
identified corporation law as one such area.72 
One parting note on Kamen is worth considering. Analyzing whether 
federal common law controlled the demand-requirement issue under the 
ICA, the Court stated that “any common law rule necessary to effectuate a 
private cause of action under [a federal statute] is necessarily federal in 
character.”73 The idea that federal common law provides any rule necessary 
to effectuate a federal cause of action could be read to give federal courts 
wide discretion to use federal common law whenever a rule of decision was 
tangentially related to a federal lawsuit. 
Lower federal courts have generally not read this principle to be an 
invitation to create federal common law.74 The Supreme Court has likewise 
 
66  Id. at 92. 
67  Id. at 97. 
68  Id. 
69  See id. at 98. 
70  See id. The more attentive readers will notice that this formulation is slightly different than the 
Boyle rule. Boyle held that state law actually controls (rather than providing the content of federal law) 
except where there is a significant conflict with a federal interest. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 
487 U.S. 500, 507–08 & n.3 (1988). Ultimately, the Court settled on the Boyle formulation, so to pay 
this slight change too much attention in the historical analysis would be both unnecessary and confusing. 
71  Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. at 97 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476–77 (1979); Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson 
Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)). 
74  See, e.g., Halebian v. Berv, 590 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2009) (filling gaps in the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 with state substantive law); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Forest Grove, Inc., 33 F.3d 
284, 290 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that Supreme Court cases counsel against using federal common law to 
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not returned to this principle and has actually reverted to the Boyle 
“significant conflict” rule rather than the two-tiered analysis originally 
articulated in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.75 and more recently 
applied in Burks v. Lasker and Kamen.76 Additionally, in its most recent 
cases, the Supreme Court has imposed rigorous limitations on and raised 
the hurdles to using federal common law. 
The first case evincing this shift was O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC.77 
At issue in O’Melveny was whether federal or state law provided the rule of 
decision in a malpractice suit brought by the FDIC—the receiver of a 
federally insured bank—against attorneys who advised the bank in a pair of 
real estate offerings.78 The FDIC sued O’Melveny & Myers in federal 
district court, alleging professional negligence and breach of fiduciary 
duty.79 The parties agreed that the FDIC asserted a cause of action created 
by California law.80 The attorneys asserted a defense that knowledge of the 
conduct of the bank’s controlling officers should be imputed to the bank 
and, therefore, to the receiver—the FDIC—so that the receiver would be 
estopped from pursuing the tort claims.81 The specific rule of decision at 
issue was the imputation of knowledge of corporate officers to the 
corporation when those officers act against the corporation’s interest.82 The 
question was whether state or federal law would provide the rule.83 
The Court began by stating that the argument that federal common law 
governed the issue was “plainly wrong” because there is no general federal 
common law.84 But the Court’s statement that state law generally “governs 
the imputation of knowledge to corporate victims of alleged negligence” 
was not the end of the analysis.85 Federal common law could still displace 
 
adjudicate a motion to strike or open a judgment confessed against defendants); Lumpkin v. Envirodyne 
Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 458 (7th Cir. 1991) (incorporating state law as the rule of decision rather than 
creating federal common law). 
75  440 U.S. 715, 718 (1979) (“To resolve this question, we must decide first whether federal or state 
law governs the controversies; and second, if federal law applies, whether this Court should fashion a 
uniform priority rule or incorporate state commercial law. We conclude that the source of law is federal, 
but that a national rule is unnecessary to protect the federal interests underlying the loan programs. 
Accordingly, we adopt state law as the appropriate federal rule for establishing the relative priority of 
these competing federal and private liens.”). 
76  Although, as we will discuss, it is unclear after Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001), whether the current standard is significant conflict or the two-tiered state 
law incorporation approach. 
77  512 U.S. 79 (1994). 
78  Id. at 80–81. 
79  Id. at 82. 
80  Id. at 83. 
81  Id. at 82. 
82  Id. at 83. 
83  Id. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. at 84–87. 
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California law in its application to the FDIC if there were a significant 
conflict between the use of state law and some federal policy or interest.86 
The Court returned to the Boyle terminology, considering whether 
“displacement of state rules” was justified in this case.87 
The Court held that the respondent failed to present any significant 
conflict with an identifiable policy or interest.88 The Court rejected claims 
that a uniform standard was needed, for the issue would not govern the 
primary conduct of the United States.89 Likewise, the Court reasoned that to 
allow the avoidance of the uncertainty and additional legal research that 
results from variations among states’ laws to qualify as an identifiable 
federal interest would open the door to far too many federal common law 
rules.90 
Even more illuminating is the Court’s firm rejection of the argument 
that federal law should control because it would disserve federal interests to 
allow California law to insulate attorneys from malpractice, with taxpayers 
ultimately bearing the costs.91 The Court described this argument as 
representing a dangerous and “facile approach to federal-common-law-
making,” flawed because it was “untethered to a genuinely identifiable (as 
opposed to judicially constructed) federal policy.”92 Asking judges to make 
the policy determinations that go into setting a standard for tort liability for 
malpractice is to ask them to perform the job that within the federal system 
“is more appropriate[] for those who write the laws.”93 
After O’Melveny, it is clear that an identifiable federal policy, 
preferably embodied in a federal statute as in Boyle,94 is necessary to argue 
that a case is “extraordinary”95 enough to warrant a federal common law 
rule of decision on a particular issue. One issue that remains unclear is 
exactly how to conduct the significant conflict analysis. The Court has 
found only once that the asserted federal policy was sufficient, so it rarely 
proceeds to the step of analyzing whether there is a conflict that rises to the 
level of significant.96 Additionally, O’Melveny shifted away from using 
state law as the content of federal law, favoring the idea that state law 
controls and federal law merely displaces when there is a significant 
 
86  Id. 
87  Id. at 87–88. 
88  Id. at 88. 
89  Id. 
90  See id. 
91  Id. at 89. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.41 (1981)). 
94  Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988). 
95  O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 89. 
96  See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. 
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conflict. O’Melveny thus reaffirmed the Court’s continuing hostility to 
federal common law rules of decision. 
In Atherton v. FDIC,97 the Supreme Court adhered to the O’Melveny 
significant conflict standard. The issue in Atherton was whether the conduct 
of the officers and directors of a federally chartered, federally insured bank 
violated the standard of care they owed to the bank.98 The threshold issue 
for the Court was whether federal common law determined the standard of 
care or whether the Court should look to state law standards.99 The Court 
noted that the decision “to displace state law is primarily a decision for 
Congress.”100 The existence of federal statutes related to an area of law at 
issue does not imply congressional intent to create federal common law, 
“for ‘Congress acts . . . against the background of the total corpus juris of 
the states . . . .’”101 
The Court then applied the O’Melveny rule that state law applies absent 
a “significant conflict” between using state law and some federal policy or 
interest.102 The Court next explored whether such a conflict existed in 
Atherton. Rejecting the argument that the need for nationwide uniformity is 
sufficient without further support, the Court noted that varying state 
approaches to corporate governance did not prevent the banking system 
from thriving.103 The Court also found little merit to the argument that 
federal common law governs the standard of care simply because the banks 
are federally chartered, since banks have long been held subject to various 
state laws.104 It is clear that a specific conflict or threat to federal interests or 
policies is required to justify the adoption of federal common law.105 
Atherton thus clarified that in addition to analyzing whether there 
exists a clearly identifiable federal policy under O’Melveny, courts will also 
examine the state law conflict with that policy. The level to which this 
conflict must rise to justify the use of federal common law remains unclear, 
but Atherton implied that the courts should require more than just a 
theoretical inconsistency. Additionally, Atherton adopted the O’Melveny 
displacement-of-state-law framework, providing consistency to choice of 
 
97  519 U.S. 213 (1997). 
98  See id. at 215. 
99  See id. at 217–18. 
100  Id. at 218 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (internal 
quotation mark omitted)). 
101  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435 (1953)). 
102  Id. 
103  See id. at 219–21. 
104  See id. at 221–23. That the federal courts settle thousands of cases every year despite having to 
use disparate state laws does not necessarily mean that arguments for a uniform federal law of 
settlements should be similarly rejected. See infra note 215 and accompanying text for an explanation of 
this position. 
105  See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 223. 
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law doctrine. Since Atherton, the Supreme Court has not analyzed the issue 
of the proper scope of federal common law as directly and as generally as it 
did in that case.106 The circuit courts of appeals currently treat Atherton and 
O’Melveny as the leading cases on the issue.107 
Nevertheless, it bears mentioning that in Semtek International Inc. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp.,108 the Supreme Court found that federal common 
law controlled “whether the claim-preclusive effect of a federal judgment 
dismissing a diversity action on statute-of-limitations grounds is determined 
by the law of the State in which the federal court sits.”109 The facts and 
procedural history of Semtek are convoluted and, ultimately, not important 
to the federal common law analysis. After rejecting various arguments for 
alternative sources of a controlling rule of decision, the Court concluded 
that federal common law governs the preclusive effect of federal 
judgments.110 The Court reached this decision by analyzing several pre-Erie 
cases that had used federal common law to determine the preclusive effect 
in state courts of judgments of federal courts on federal question cases.111 
Those cases, the Court reasoned, stood for the principle that the Supreme 
Court had the final say on how state courts treat federal judgments, which 
meant that federal common law must govern issues of claim preclusion.112 
The Court then observed that the issue of the preclusive effect of 
federal diversity judgments was a “classic case” for adopting state law as 
the federal rule.113 The Court rejected the idea that there needed to be a 
uniform federal rule, saying that the more persuasive argument for 
uniformity is having the same preclusive rule apply whether a state or 
federal court dismissed the case.114 The Court clarified, however, that 
should state law be incompatible with federal interests, a federal rule would 
be justified.115 This last part of the analysis harkens to the significant 
conflict test, though mere incompatibility is insufficient under that standard. 
Outside of this reminder that federal common law remains limited to 
the extent state law can address the issue, Semtek is not particularly helpful 
as a federal common law decision. Its analysis, which has been accused of 
 
106  See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 434–53 (describing Supreme Court federal common law 
doctrine and ending with Atherton). 
107  See, e.g., Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(analyzing a federal common law issue and citing Atherton and O’Melveny). 
108  531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
109  Id. at 499. 
110  Id. at 508. 
111  See id. at 507. 
112  See id. at 507–08. 
113  Id. at 508. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. at 509. 
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having an “ipse dixit quality” about it,116 did not apply any broader rules on 
when federal common law is justified, such as the significant conflict test. It 
did not cite other federal common law cases or announce a rule about 
federal common law in general.117 As a result, the case does not assist lower 
courts in considering whether federal common law should govern 
settlement enforcement proceedings of federal question cases. Furthermore, 
by returning to the two-tiered approach last seen in Kamen, where the Court 
stated that federal common law controls but incorporates state law, the 
Court further muddled existing doctrine and made determining the proper 
framework more difficult.118 In light of this confusion, it is not surprising 
that lower courts have taken Atherton and O’Melveny to be the leading 
cases on the issue of federal common law. 
The line of cases beginning with Texas Industries and culminating in 
Atherton makes it clear that the Supreme Court is generally skeptical 
towards federal common law rules of decision in modern choice of law 
doctrine. Federal common law is permitted in very few and specific areas of 
law, such as admiralty, interstate and international disputes, and in cases 
involving the rights and obligations of the United States. If a particular 
dispute does not fall into one of these categories, a federal common law rule 
of decision will only be used if state law creates a significant conflict with a 
clearly identifiable federal policy. While this conflict analysis is the proper 
mode of determining choice of law in settlement enforcement proceedings, 
the circuit courts have generally failed to apply it in that context. 
B. The Circuits Take Their Positions 
As this Article’s Introduction suggested, settlements and settlement-
related disputes are not unusual. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the 
circuits have all taken a position on whether state or federal law controls a 
settlement enforcement proceeding where the underlying claim is based on 
federal question jurisdiction. As the last section explained, standards that 
govern a federal court’s choice between federal common law and state law 
should operate to rein in federal common law. Somewhat surprisingly, 
however, only one decision from an appellate court has analyzed the issue 
 
116  Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 
612 (2006). As a result, even guidance from this case gleaned through factual analogy would be 
minimal. 
117  See Semtek¸ 531 U.S. at 507–09. 
118  Fortunately for our purposes, there is skepticism as to whether the “incompatibility” and 
“substantial conflict” tests ever lead to different outcomes. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 
500, 507 n.3 (1988). The problem is more of an issue on what terminology to use on the one hand, and 
what the choice of formulation suggests about the Court’s view of the proper limits on federal common 
law. Because the case law at both the Supreme Court level and in the circuits provides much more 
analysis with many more examples when using the significant conflict test, that test is the one we will 
apply in our analysis. 
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under the proper Supreme Court precedent.119 Others neglect to provide any 
analysis, misuse authority, or ignore the important issues while treating 
largely irrelevant ones as dispositive.120 This section will explore the 
different positions taken in the case law and identify common analytical 
deficiencies. 
The circuits fall into two camps on this choice of law issue, though 
each suffers from deficiencies in reasoning or use of precedent. The First, 
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have held that federal common law 
controls. The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits have all held that state law controls. Only the Second Circuit, in a 
single case, has conducted a proper analysis of how the governing Supreme 
Court cases might relate to settlement enforcement proceedings, although 
the court has since backed off its position. This section will start by 
examining this Second Circuit case and then proceed to explain the 
shortcomings in the analyses of the other circuit courts. 
1. The Lone Example of a Proper Analysis.—The Second Circuit is 
the only circuit to properly analyze whether federal or state law would 
control a settlement enforcement proceeding where the underlying case was 
based on federal claims, albeit in dicta. In Ciaramella v. Reader’s Digest 
Association, the Second Circuit recognized the applicability of the Atherton 
line of cases to the choice of law in a settlement enforcement proceeding.121 
In that case, the plaintiff sued his former employer alleging violations of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and ERISA.122 Prior to discovery, 
the parties negotiated a settlement and the defendant prepared a draft 
agreement containing language that the settlement was not final until 
executed by all parties and their attorneys.123 After the plaintiff authorized 
his original attorney to accept, the plaintiff’s attorney suggested several 
revisions to the defendants.124 The defendants accepted those changes and 
the plaintiff’s attorney indicated to the defendants, “We have a deal.”125 
Meanwhile, the plaintiff consulted with a second attorney about the 
settlement, determined that the settlement was not acceptable, and refused 
to sign the updated version.126 The defendant then moved to enforce the 
settlement.127 
The Second Circuit first found that it need not decide the choice of law 
issue because there was no material difference between the relevant state 
 
119  See Ciaramella v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 131 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 1997). 
120  See infra Part I.B.2–3. 
121  131 F.3d 320. 
122  Id. at 321. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
126  Id. 
127  Id. 
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law and federal common law.128 Under both New York state law and federal 
common law,129 parties can settle a case orally even if a future written 
memorialization of the terms is contemplated.130 But if the parties do not 
intend to be bound until there is a signed, written agreement, an oral 
agreement is not binding.131 After discussing these principles, the court 
entertained the defendant’s argument that the court ought to exercise its 
power to fashion a new federal common law rule that any time both parties’ 
attorneys agreed on all material terms, an oral settlement would be 
binding.132 The court rejected this argument, noting that Atherton required a 
significant conflict between the use of state law and federal policy before 
departing from state law as the rule of decision.133 The court did not find a 
conflict between federal policy and the relevant rule.134 The court noted that 
at least one of the statutes at issue expressed a preference for voluntary 
settlements of claims.135 The state common law rule was that the oral 
agreement at issue was not binding because it was not in writing. The court 
found that this rule does not conflict with the federal interest in encouraging 
settlements, and actually promotes settlements and gives effect to the intent 
of the parties.136 The defendant’s proposed rule—that oral agreements 
should be binding—would deter parties from negotiating settlements in fear 
of being locked into an agreement they never wanted.137 
Because the court did not have to choose between federal and state 
law, the choice of law issue in settlement enforcement disputes technically 
 
128  Id. at 322. 
129  The cases the Second Circuit relied upon for its source of federal common law on this topic were 
Taylor v. Gordon Flesch Co., 793 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1986) and Board of Trustees v. Vic Construction 
Corp., 825 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Ciaramella, 131 F.3d at 322. The Seventh Circuit case 
involved a settlement of a Title VII claim and based its authority to create federal common law on a 
prior case, Lyles v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 684 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1982), that 
relied on a Fifth Circuit case, Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 
1981), whose reasoning is debunked at length below. See Taylor, 793 F.2d at 862; infra notes 138–42 
and accompanying text. The district court case involved an ERISA settlement, and the court reasoned, 
based on a concurring opinion in an outdated Supreme Court case and a few subsequent (and poorly 
reasoned) circuit court cases, that federal common law could be created in that context. Bd. of Trs., 
825 F. Supp. at 464, 465 (citing D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471–72 (1942) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). The Second Circuit was not, however, necessarily supporting the legitimacy 
of those prior courts acting to make federal common law pertaining to the settlement of federal claims, 
but merely referring to the existence of such federal common law. See Ciaramella, 131 F.3d at 322. 
130  Ciaramella, 131 F.3d at 322. 
131  Id. 
132  Id. at 322–23. 
133  Id. at 323. 
134  See id. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137  See id. 
107:127 (2012) Settling the Confusion 
 145 
remains open in the Second Circuit.138 Nevertheless, the case is important 
because the court appeared to recognize that the Atherton line of Supreme 
Court cases governs the choice of law analysis. Prior cases in the Second 
Circuit had held that federal common law controlled settlement 
enforcement disputes where the underlying claim was based on federal 
law.139 The Second Circuit’s willingness to engage in the proper analysis 
was a good sign, one that its sister circuits have generally missed. 
2. Circuits in Which Federal Law Controls.—A minority of circuits 
hold that federal common law controls settlement enforcement proceedings 
when the underlying claim is a federal question.140 While this Article and 
strong arguments support this position, none of these circuits have 
conducted a truly thorough analysis. More specifically, none have applied 
the modern standard for the application of federal common law set forth in 
the Atherton line of cases. Under the modern standard, a court should 
assume that state law provides a rule of decision unless there is a significant 
conflict between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the use of 
state law.141 
The First Circuit uses federal law in settlement enforcement 
proceedings where a federal cause of action is the underlying claim.142 The 
court now treats the issue as settled, relying on its prior cases. The problem 
with this approach is that the Supreme Court’s shift against federal common 
law has altered the legal landscape upon which it relies. The First Circuit’s 
approach goes back to Malave v. Carney Hospital,143 a case involving a 
settlement dispute arising out of federal employment discrimination claims. 
The court applied federal law to the settlement enforcement proceedings.144 
Providing no further reasoning, the court cited several pre-1990 cases that 
predate the Atherton line of cases that solidified the presumption against 
 
138  See Kaczmarcysk v. Dutton, 414 F. App’x 354, 355 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Ciaramella, 131 F.3d 
at 322) (“[T]he question of whether New York or federal common law determines whether parties have 
reached a settlement is an open question in our Circuit . . . .”). 
139  See, e.g., Pereira v. Sonia Holdings, Ltd. (In re Artha Mgmt., Inc.), 91 F.3d 326, 328, 329 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (applying federal law where the underlying case arose under the Bankruptcy Code); Fennell 
v. TLB Kent Co., 865 F.2d 498, 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying federal law where the underlying 
case arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1981). These previous cases can be traced back to a line of cases from 
other circuits that were predicated on an understanding of the role of federal common law that had 
drastically changed by the time Atherton came down in 1997. These cases required reexamination after 
the modern trend against federal common law became clear. 
140  This includes the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, though it is not entirely clear that the 
Fourth Circuit still adheres to this view, as discussed below. See infra note 147. 
141  Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997). 
142  See Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 246 F.3d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 2001). 
143  170 F.3d 217, 220 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Quint, 246 F.3d at 14 (applying federal law and 
citing Malave as its binding authority). 
144  See Malave, 170 F.3d at 219–20. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 146 
federal common law.145 The cases cited by the First Circuit did not support 
the position that federal law controls all settlement enforcement 
proceedings where the underlying claim is federal in nature.146 
The Third, Fifth, and, at times, the Fourth147 Circuits take similar 
positions and support them with cases and reasoning inconsistent with 
modern Supreme Court doctrine. The Third Circuit’s shortcomings stem 
from a case that relied on an inapposite Supreme Court decision to support 
the proposition that federal law controls settlement agreements where the 
 
145  See id. at 220. Those four cases are Michaud v. Michaud, 932 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1991); Fennell v. 
TLB Kent Co., 865 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1989); Mid-S. Towing Co. v. Har-Win, Inc., 733 F.2d 386 (5th 
Cir. 1984) (a maritime law case); and Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112 (4th 
Cir. 1983). 
146  The Fennell case no longer appears to control in the Second Circuit, as that court has recognized 
the impact of the Atherton line of cases. See Ciaramella v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 131 F.3d 320, 322–23 
(2d Cir. 1997). As for the First Circuit case that the Malave court relied on, Michaud, it was brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Michaud, 932 F.2d at 78. Section 1983 is unique in that a second statute, 
42 U.S.C. § 1988, explicitly requires that courts first look to federal law on all matters pertaining to 
§ 1983 suits. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2006). If federal law is deficient, a court should look to state law 
to fill in the gaps. See id. (“The jurisdiction . . . conferred on the district courts by the provisions of [this 
Title] for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, 
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are 
suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are 
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the 
common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court 
having jurisdiction . . . is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, shall . . . govern . . . .”). While the Michaud case did not explain that this was the basis 
for using federal law with respect to that settlement, the case Michaud relied on, Furtado v. Bishop, did 
explain the role of § 1988 in the choice of law analysis where § 1983 claims are involved. 604 F.2d 80, 
97 (1st Cir. 1979). Because of § 1988’s command, federal common law should control settlement 
enforcement proceedings of § 1983 claims. Express statutory authority to create federal common law is 
one of the well-founded exceptions to the limitations placed on common law, see Tex. Indus., Inc. v. 
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981), but the First Circuit has failed to recognize this basis 
for distinguishing Michaud. 
The other cases the Malave court cited are similarly inapplicable; one was a maritime law case. See 
Mid-S. Towing Co., 733 F.2d at 389. Like express statutory exceptions, maritime law is another area 
where federal common law is permitted. See Tex. Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641. As for the Fourth Circuit 
case it cited, Gamewell, that case no longer appears to be controlling law in that circuit. See, e.g., Moore 
v. Beaufort Cnty. N.C., 936 F.2d 159, 162 (4th Cir. 1991). 
147  See Gamewell, 715 F.2d at 114. The interesting part of the reasoning of this case was that the 
court stated it had the option to use federal common law for “open questions incident to the adjudication 
of federal statutory claims.” Id. This position was eroded by subsequent Supreme Court cases and is 
inconsistent with contemporary doctrine. See supra notes 77–106 and accompanying text. Later cases in 
the Fourth Circuit generally avoid choosing between federal and state law in settlement enforcement 
proceedings and no longer cite Gamewell, stating instead that “the controlling factor must in either event 
be the intentions of the parties.” Piver v. Pender Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1083 (4th Cir. 
1987); see Moore, 936 F.2d at 162. But see Silicon Image, Inc. v. Genesis Microchip, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 
2d 840, 848 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding that federal law controls settlement enforcement proceeding where 
underlying claim is a patent infringement action and citing Gamewell as controlling authority). 
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underlying right to sue derives from a federal statute.148 Similarly, the Fifth 
Circuit’s leading case, Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,149 is based on 
an outdated Supreme Court decision that is inconsistent with modern 
doctrine.150 Fulgence came down in 1981, and its analysis is indicative of 
the more relaxed view of federal common law that prevailed at that time.151 
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit continues to rely on Fulgence and its 
progeny for the rule that federal law controls settlements of federal 
claims.152 
Generally, circuit decisions holding that federal common law controls 
settlement enforcement proceedings where the underlying cause of action is 
 
148  See Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 946 (3d Cir. 1997). Williams v. Metzler involved a 
settlement enforcement proceeding where the underlying claim was brought under the federal Energy 
Reorganization Act. Id. at 940. On the choice of law issue, the court held that the settlement agreement 
at issue involved a right to sue derived from a federal statute, and thus federal common law principles 
governed the construction of the contract. Id. at 946. For support, the court cited Town of Newton v. 
Rumery, which analyzed the validity of a criminal defendant’s waiver of any § 1983 claims he might 
have in return for the prosecution dropping the criminal charges against him. 480 U.S. 386, 391–92 
(1987). The defendant ultimately brought a § 1983 action and claimed that the waiver was invalid as 
against public policy; the city moved to dismiss on the basis of the prior settlement. Id. The Supreme 
Court stated that “[t]he agreement purported to waive a right to sue conferred by a federal statute. The 
question whether the policies underlying that statute may in some circumstances render that waiver 
unenforceable is a question of federal law.” Id. at 392. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not cite any federal common law cases, nor has it been 
cited in subsequent federal common law Supreme Court cases like O’Melveny or Atherton, leading to 
the inexorable conclusion that it simply is not to be considered a federal common law case. Furthermore, 
there is a fundamental difference between the Rumery waiver scenario and typical settlement 
enforcement disputes: in the former the Court is asking whether such a resolution is allowed under the 
federal statute, while in the latter the Court is merely interpreting the terms or determining the existence 
of the agreement. Therefore, the Third Circuit’s use of Rumery as authority for the use of federal law in 
all settlement enforcement proceedings is very tenuous. 
149  662 F.2d 1207, 1208 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing the issue as being one of first impression). 
150  The court’s analysis begins with the proposition that since it is dealing with a federal statutory 
scheme, Title VII, to be precise, that “the federal courts are competent to determine whether a settlement 
exists without resort to state law.” Id. at 1209. The only opinion the court cites for this proposition is a 
concurring opinion from a 1942 Supreme Court case. See id. (citing D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 
315 U.S. 447, 471–72 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (asserting a federal court’s freedom to create 
federal common law when it is related to federal statutes or the Constitution)). The D’Oench case, 
however, predates and is inconsistent with the modern Supreme Court law. See Atherton v. FDIC, 
519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (“Nor does the existence of related federal statutes automatically show that 
Congress intended courts to create federal common-law rules . . . .”). 
151  For example, the Fulgence court argues that creation of a federal rule rather than use of a state 
rule is appropriate where “the rights of the litigants and the operative legal policies derive from a federal 
source.” See Fulgence, 662 F.2d at 1209. This language is clearly more accepting of federal common 
law than the Atherton significant conflict analysis. 
152  See Macktal v. Sec’y of Labor, 923 F.2d 1150, 1157 n.32 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Fulgence, 662 
F.2d at 1209); Liger v. New Orleans Hornets NBA Ltd. P’ship, No. 05-01969, 2010 WL 3952006, at *2 
(E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2010) (citing Mid-South Towing Co. v. Har-Win, Inc., 733 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 
1984), as a case that relies on Fulgence for the proposition that “[w]here the substantive rights and 
liabilities of the parties derive from federal law, the enforceability or validity of a settlement agreement 
is determined by federal law”). 
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federal in nature all suffer from analytical deficiencies. Their rules are 
artifacts of a bygone era where federal common law was more pervasive. 
Supreme Court precedent has changed its tone towards federal courts 
creating federal common law, and these circuits have not adjusted to this 
doctrinal shift. These circuits have not clarified whether the use of state law 
in these proceedings would present a significant conflict with a federal 
policy or interest, the modern threshold for the use of federal common law. 
3. Circuits in Which State Law Controls.—Likewise, the majority of 
circuits that hold that state law applies to federal question settlement 
proceedings have failed to conduct an adequate conflict analysis.153 These 
circuits do not adequately entertain the possible federal interests impacted 
by their decisions, instead narrowly focusing on the settlement as a contract 
between private parties. 
Several such circuits have, at times, come close to considering the right 
issues in recognizing the modern shift against federal common law. The 
Eleventh Circuit in Resnick v. Uccello Immobilien GMBH, Inc. examined 
the enforceability of a settlement agreement that required a property owner 
to bring its building into compliance with the ADA within 30 days.154 On 
the choice of law issue, the Eleventh Circuit held that state contract law 
applied.155 The court, using the Supreme Court’s rule from Texas Industries, 
maintained that it “disfavor[ed] federal common law” and would apply 
federal common law in “only rare instances concerning ‘rights and 
obligation[s] of the United States, interstate and international disputes 
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign 
nations, and admiralty cases.’”156 The Resnick court failed to realize that 
Texas Industries was but the beginning of the line of cases explaining when 
and how federal common law applies. Post-Atherton, federal common law 
also can be created whenever there is a significant conflict between some 
federal policy or interest and the use of state law.157 The Resnick court’s 
failure to recognize that the use of federal common law was not quite as 
limited post-Atherton as compared to Texas Industries resulted in the 
application of a rule that was unduly restrictive of federal common law. 
There is at least an argument that the ADA embodies significant federal 
interests in ensuring the integrity of the rights of disabled persons, policies 
 
153  These circuits include the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. 
154  227 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2000). 
155  Id. at 1350 (citing Schwartz v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that state law applied to the construction and enforceability of a settlement agreement arising under Title 
VII)). The court also issued a general rule that “[p]rinciples governing general contract law apply to 
interpret settlement agreements.” Id. 
156  Id. at 1350 n.4 (quoting Kobatake v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 162 F.3d 619, 624 n.3 
(11th Cir. 1998)). 
157  See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (citing Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 
384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). 
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that could feasibly be undermined by the state law rules applied in that case. 
However, the Resnick rule precludes analysis of these issues. 
The D.C. Circuit has similarly come close to the proper approach with 
its fairly thorough analysis in Makins v. District of Columbia.158 This 
decision, like Resnick, contains solid analysis recognizing the limitations on 
federal common law. But it too erred by requiring explicit statutory 
rulemaking authority before a court can create federal common law.159 This 
rulemaking authority is not required under present doctrine—federal courts 
can create federal common law rules of decision where there is a significant 
conflict with a federal policy or interest. Thus, the Makins court unduly 
restricted federal common law. 
While these courts at least acknowledged Supreme Court precedent, 
other courts that have selected state law for settlement enforcement 
proceedings have ignored it entirely. One primary example is the Tenth 
Circuit in United States v. McCall.160 In McCall, the court examined an 
alleged settlement agreement between the Farmers Home Administration 
(FmHA) and a farmer over the farmer’s outstanding debt owed to FmHA.161 
After settlement negotiations, a dispute arose as to whether a final 
agreement had been reached.162 On the choice of law issue, the Tenth 
Circuit held that state contract law controlled, merely citing a single case 
and providing no further analysis.163 
 
158  277 F.3d 544, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
159  At issue in Makins was “under what circumstances, if any,” an attorney may bind his client to a 
settlement agreement stemming from a Title VII lawsuit without having actual authority from the client. 
Id. at 545. The plaintiff, a female employee of the District of Columbia, brought a lawsuit against her 
employer, alleging sex discrimination and retaliatory firing in violation of Title VII. Id. In a settlement 
conference with a magistrate judge, the parties’ attorneys reached a settlement agreement. Id. The 
plaintiff was not physically present but was in contact with her attorney throughout the settlement 
conference via cell phone. Id. at 545–46. The plaintiff, however, upon being presented with the written 
settlement agreement by her lawyer, refused to sign the agreement and the defendant filed a motion to 
enforce the settlement. Id. at 546. 
In holding that local law, rather than federal common law, applies to the determination of whether a 
settlement should be enforced, the court began by expressing doubt both that the federal courts had 
power to formulate law in this area and that there was a need for national uniformity on this issue. Id. at 
547–48. The court then endorsed the principle that “neutral state laws that do not undermine federal 
interests should be applied unless some statute (or the Constitution) authorizes the federal court to create 
a rule of decision.” Id. at 548 (quoting Morgan v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 
1986)). Further, the court recognized the benefit to members of the bar of knowing that the law 
governing the settlements they negotiate will be the same whether they are in a state or federal court. Id. 
Noting the lack of a statute permitting lawmaking by the federal courts and the absence of the United 
States as a party, the court determined local law was appropriate. Id. at 548. 
160  235 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2000). 
161  Id. at 1213. 
162  Id. at 1213–14. 
163  Id. at 1215. That single case is a Seventh Circuit case and is part of a line of authority that 
actually traces back to a Fifth Circuit case, which itself cites a Tenth Circuit case that actually applies 
federal law to a settlement enforcement dispute. See Carr v. Runyan, 89 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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The Sixth Circuit’s analysis likewise comes up short. In Michigan 
Regional Council of Carpenters v. New Century Bancorp, Inc.,164 the Sixth 
Circuit considered the enforceability of a settlement agreement of alleged 
securities law violations brought by a stock purchaser against a corporation 
and its controlling shareholder.165 The court, in holding that the settlement 
agreement was enforceable, applied Michigan state contract law.166 The 
court neither cited to any authority nor gave any analysis as to why state law 
governed the enforcement of this settlement even though the underlying 
claims were for violations of federal securities laws.167 Similarly, the 
Eighth168 and Ninth169 Circuits have yet to properly analyze the choice of 
law in this area. In what is potentially a good sign, however, the Ninth 
 
The Seventh Circuit case law ultimately leads back to a Fifth Circuit case, Florida Education Ass’n v. 
Atkinson, 481 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1973). That case also has no analysis, simply stating the rule and citing 
Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit cases. See id. at 663. Thus, the case law runs full circle back to a Tenth 
Circuit case where the United States was a party and the court actually applied federal law in construing 
the settlement agreements. See Homestake-Sapin Partners v. United States, 375 F.2d 507, 511 (10th Cir. 
1967). 
Questionable basis in law aside, the McCall rule is difficult to understand when considered in light 
of Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). In Texas Industries, the Court 
specifically made it clear that one of the very limited areas where federal common law exists is where 
the rights and obligations of the United States are at stake. Id. at 641. A settlement of a lawsuit where 
the United States is a party would certainly seem to involve the rights and obligations of the United 
States. In fact, at least one circuit has recognized this connection. See Makins, 277 F.3d at 548. 
164  99 F. App’x 15 (6th Cir. 2004). 
165  Id. at 16. 
166  Id. at 21 (“As a matter of Michigan contract law, which governs the validity of the settlement 
agreement in this case, attorneys are considered to have the apparent authority to settle lawsuits on 
behalf of their clients, and opposing parties have the right to rely upon the existence of such settlements 
when agreed to by attorneys.”). 
167  See id. 
168  See, e.g., Sheng v. Starkey Labs., Inc., 53 F.3d 192, 194 (8th Cir. 1995). In that case, a 
settlement dispute arose regarding claims under Title VII. See id. at 193. The Eighth Circuit did not even 
identify that there was an issue as to whether federal or state law controlled the enforcement proceeding. 
See id. at 194. It simply stated that “[s]ettlement agreements are governed by basic principles of contract 
law” and proceeded to apply Minnesota law. Id. 
169  See, e.g., United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 
1992). That case involved a settlement dispute where the underlying lawsuit was brought under the 
Lanham Act and California state unfair competition law. See id. at 855. The court concluded state law 
governed even when the underlying cause of action is federal. Id. at 856. The court provided no further 
analysis as to why this is the case, and as authority it cited two cases. Id. The first of these cases gave no 
analysis and only relied on a Seventh Circuit case that also gave no analysis of the issue. See Jeff D. v. 
Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass’n, Local 550 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1983)). The second case predated the modern 
line of Supreme Court cases and therefore did not apply the federal common law standards set forth in 
those cases. See Commercial Paper Holders v. R. W. Hine (In re Beverly Hills Bancorp), 649 F.2d 1329, 
1332–33 (9th Cir. 1981) (deciding state law applied to a settlement dispute stemming from a bankruptcy 
action and relying solely on the facts that the settlement was not a government contract, nor was it a 
consent decree, and that it was “a contract and must be construed under the laws of California”). 
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Circuit may be distancing itself from its earlier flawed cases, having 
recently suggested that the choice of law question is an open one.170 
The Seventh Circuit has also given a very clear ruling on the source of 
the rules for settlement enforcement suits where the underlying claim is a 
federal lawsuit. In Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc.,171 which involved a 
claim for copyright infringement, the court stated that the issue was settled: 
state law controlled.172 The court took the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co.173 to imply that state law would 
govern all settlement enforcement proceedings brought to enforce the 
settlement of a federal suit.174 In Kokkonen, a lawsuit before a federal 
district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship settled and was 
dismissed with prejudice.175 Later, a dispute arose pertaining to the return of 
certain files under the settlement agreement, and one of the parties sought 
enforcement of the agreement.176 The Supreme Court found that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction over the subsequent suit to enforce the settlement 
agreement where the district court overseeing the settlement did not 
expressly retain jurisdiction.177 The Lynch court reasoned that if federal law 
controlled the enforcement of settlement agreements reached in federal 
court, “the suit would arise under federal law and thus be within the 
jurisdiction of the federal court” even if diversity were not present.178 The 
Seventh Circuit reasoned that, because there was no jurisdiction in 
Kokkonen, federal law does not control such actions.179 
The problem with this logic is that in Kokkonen all the claims were 
state law claims before the court as a matter of diversity of citizenship.180 As 
discussed above, there are three jurisdictional bases under which a case can 
be before a federal court: federal question jurisdiction, diversity 
jurisdiction, or a combination of federal claims and supplemental state law 
claims. It could easily be argued that where there is an underlying federal 
 
170  See Ellerd v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 273 F. App’x 669, 670 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to decide 
whether federal or state law governed a settlement dispute where the underlying claim was brought 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act because the result would be the same). But see Kirkland v. Legion 
Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that state law controls settlement enforcement 
proceedings for federal class actions and citing Jeff D., 899 F.2d at 759). 
171  279 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2002). 
172  Id. at 490. 
173  511 U.S. 375 (1994). 
174  Lynch, 279 F.3d at 489. 
175  Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376–77. 
176  Id. at 377. 
177  Id. at 381–82. 
178  Lynch, 279 F.3d at 490. 
179  Id. Apparently, the diversity jurisdiction that existed for the underlying claim was not met in the 
settlement enforcement action, presumably because the controversy was over the return of certain files 
rather than monetary. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
180  Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376–77. 
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law claim that ultimately settles, this settlement is controlled by federal law. 
Since Kokkonen only dealt with state law claims, it is distinguishable from 
the enforcement of a settlement of federal question claims, or those cases 
like Lynch with both federal and state claims.181 
The Lynch court necessarily assumed that settlements of federal 
question cases and diversity cases should be treated the same for choice of 
law purposes. It took a case regarding jurisdiction over the settlement of 
state law claims in diversity and found it to imply choice of law principles 
for federal question claims. Since the Lynch court did not engage in an 
analysis of the relevant considerations of whether federal common law 
would be appropriate for federal question claims and instead relied on 
Kokkonen, its reasoning is flawed. The use of state law in settlement 
enforcement actions where the underlying claim was a federal question 
claim is not a logical consequence of Kokkonen. 
Regardless of whether a given circuit court of appeals has found 
federal or state law to control the enforcement of settlements of federal 
claims, the decisions across the circuits do not adequately analyze the 
question. Many courts that apply federal law do so on the basis of cases that 
were decided in an era of looser standards for federal common law. The 
courts that apply state law tend to do so based on arguments that limit 
federal common law too much and in doing so fail to sufficiently consider 
federal interests that might be affected by the settlement context. The most 
important thing is to highlight the need to revisit rules premised on an 
outdated understanding of the controlling law. The next Part will explore 
the proper contours of the choice of law analysis as it relates to settlement 
enforcement proceedings in federal question cases. 
II. PROTECTING THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN SETTLEMENTS WITH FEDERAL 
COMMON LAW RULES 
Despite the varied approaches and conclusions of the circuit courts in 
choosing either state or federal law to control settlement enforcement 
proceedings, the controlling Supreme Court law is fairly clear. A few basic 
propositions are apparent. State law provides the rule of decision unless the 
case falls into one of a number of enclaves where federal common law is 
permitted. There are a number of such areas that have already been 
delineated where federal common law should apply, including international 
and interstate disputes, admiralty cases, and cases where the Unites States is 
a party.182 If the underlying suit arises in one of these areas, the settlement 
 
181  Lynch, 279 F.3d at 489. 
182  See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981). Of course, if the 
settlement itself is of a case that fits into one of these categories, federal common law should control. 
See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (“[O]bligations to and rights of the 
United States under its contracts are governed exclusively by federal law.”). 
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enforcement should be governed by federal common law.183 Otherwise, 
settlement of federal cases does not fall within these identified areas; 
however, federal common law may still apply provided there is a significant 
conflict with a federal policy or interest created by using state law.184 
Additionally, the asserted federal interest is much more likely to satisfy the 
requirement if it is clearly identifiable and tethered to a federal statute.185 
This Part will first describe three federal interests associated with 
settlements of federal claims that are sufficient to meet the standards under 
Atherton. First, the federal courts have a broad institutional interest in 
overseeing their affairs, particularly with respect to such a pervasive 
element of modern civil litigation. Second, there is a federal policy in 
promoting and achieving the settlement of federal lawsuits. Third, there 
may be statute-specific federal policies and interests affected by 
settlements. This Part will discuss each interest in turn and will consider the 
possibility of significant conflicts that state law could present. These 
potential conflicts highlight the situations in which, even if a blanket 
application of federal common law is not adopted, federal courts should be 
prepared to invoke federal common law to protect the federal policy of 
promoting settlements. 
A. The Institutional Interests of the Federal Courts in Autonomy and 
Overseeing Their Own Affairs 
The most significant federal interest implicated by the rules of decision 
that federal courts use to adjudicate settlement enforcement proceedings is 
the federal courts’ institutional interest in overseeing procedures used to 
manage their dockets. Settlement conferences take place in federal district 
courts every day. Consequently, disputes about the resulting settlement 
 
183  Where the underlying federal suit was, in fact, brought under one of those categories, some 
courts have used federal common law to adjudicate a settlement enforcement proceeding. See, e.g., 
Brewer v. Muscle Shoals Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying federal common 
law to a settlement agreement negotiated by the EEOC); Borne v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, Inc., 
780 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying federal common law to determine “the validity and 
enforceability of agreements settling the rights of a seaman”); Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, 
Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1516 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying federal common law to interpret an executive order 
conciliation agreement). Confusingly, however, federal courts do not always use federal common law in 
this context. See, e.g., United States v. McCall, 235 F.3d 1211, 1213–15 (10th Cir. 2000) (using state 
law to adjudicate a settlement enforcement dispute where the underlying case was one where the United 
States was a party); Dillow v. Ashland, Inc., No. 97-6108, 1999 WL 685941, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 
1999) (using state substantive law to determine the validity of a settlement agreement where the 
underlying claim was one based on admiralty law). Ultimately, this disagreement, along with its origins 
and contours, falls outside the focus of this Article. The arguments in favor of federal common law in 
settlement disputes involving federal claims also apply to these types of cases. With these cases, 
however, the use of federal common law is supported even more so by the fact that the underlying case 
is one where courts have already recognized the appropriateness of federal common law. 
184  See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 223 (1997). 
185  See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 89 (1994). 
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agreements are common. Allowing state law (with its inherent variations) to 
dictate the rules applying to settlements of federal claims comes at a great 
cost to judicial economy. Uniform federal common law standards would be 
much more consistent with these federal interests, allowing the federal 
courts to efficiently run their dockets free from the interference of state law. 
The federal courts set their own procedural rules for how business is 
done within the walls of the courts. From start to finish, there are federal 
rules that govern the entire litigation process. Examples of this broad power 
include the establishment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
other national rules of procedure and evidence,186 local court rules 
applicable to the entire federal district court docket,187 and standing orders 
promulgated by a particular judge.188 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the federal judiciary has “inherent power[s], governed not 
by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage 
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of 
cases.”189 The federal courts thus have the autonomy to manage the federal 
claims that they adjudicate up until those cases purportedly settle, at which 
point federal judges are left to determine whether to apply federal or state 
law to the settlement disputes before them. The issues governed by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include pleading, service of process, 
motion practice, discovery, trial, judgment, and postjudgment proceedings. 
Despite the important role settlement plays in the litigation process, there 
are no rules governing settlement. If there ever were a fitting place for 
federal common law, the set of rules governing the settlement of federal 
claims is it. 
Additionally, the federal courts determine the binding effect of the 
judgments they enter.190 This was the lesson learned from the Supreme 
Court in Semtek. In Semtek, the Court held that federal common law would 
determine the preclusive effect of a judgment of a federal court sitting in 
diversity.191 The only explanation the Court offered was that the Court had 
 
186  Although Congress does retain veto power over these Rules, they are drafted by officers of the 
federal courts, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States, and promulgated by the 
Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 333, 2071–2077 (2006). 
187  See id. § 2071; 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 23 (2003). 
188  See, e.g., Standing Order Setting Settlement Conference, Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow 
(Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/JUDGES/DENLOW/MDSCORD.pdf. 
189  Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted). Another 
example of this authority is that each court controls the admission of attorneys to practice before them 
and governs their conduct, despite the fact that attorneys are licensed by individual states. See, e.g., 
LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS LR83.10, at 
40–41 (2012), available at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/LocalRules.aspx?rtab=localrule. 
190  See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507 (2001). 
191  See id. 
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long held that federal law controlled the preclusive effect of federal court 
judgments in federal question cases.192 
The combination of the federal judiciary’s powers over both its internal 
procedures and the binding effect of its decisions and judgments implies a 
broad institutional interest of the federal judiciary in controlling its own 
affairs. Just as the federal courts control how litigants must plead, discover, 
motion, and try their cases, the federal courts should control what steps are 
necessary to create a binding settlement. Because settlements are crucial to 
the everyday affairs of federal courts and greatly impact their operation, the 
procedural rules governing how litigants reach settlements are of great 
importance to those courts. One would be hard-pressed to identify an area 
that is more central to the management of the federal judiciary’s “own 
affairs” relating to the achievement of “the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases”193 than the rules pertaining to settlements. 
Furthermore, just as federal common law determines the preclusive effect 
of federal judgments, federal common law should also have the final say in 
deciding the effect of settlements of federal claims that take place within the 
federal court system.194 In other words, federal common law should be used 
in settlement enforcement proceedings arising out of cases brought under 
the court’s federal question jurisdiction.195 
The institutional interest of the federal courts in controlling their own 
affairs is supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Dice v. Akron, 
Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.196 In Dice, the Supreme Court held that 
federal common law controlled the validity of a waiver of claims under 
FELA.197 But the language and reasoning of Dice was much broader than 
that particular statute. The primary concerns of the Dice Court were to 
protect the erosion of federal rights by the operation of state law and to 
 
192  See id. 
193  Link, 370 U.S. at 630–31. 
194  It is worth noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 specifies that federal common law governs 
claims of evidentiary privilege in federal question cases, but that state law governs evidentiary privilege 
in diversity cases. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
195  The federal question settlement-dispute context is actually more amenable to federal common 
law than the issue in Semtek. In the settlement area, the substantive law of the underlying suit is federal, 
while in Semtek the underlying substantive law involved state law statutes of limitation. See Semtek, 
531 U.S. at 499; Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 116, at 613. The fact that Semtek involved claims 
brought under state law may even suggest that federal common law would be justified in settlement 
enforcement disputes where the underlying federal jurisdiction is based on diversity. In diversity cases, 
the underlying substantive law would be premised on state law, just like in Semtek. But in Semtek, this 
aspect did not prevent the Court from using federal common law to address the procedures in federal 
courts. Be it the effect of a dismissal or the effect of conduct with respect to settlement, both arguably 
involve procedural concerns. This argument, however, extends past the scope of this Article and is an 
area ripe for analysis elsewhere. 
196  342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952); see supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text. 
197  342 U.S. at 361. 
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effectuate the purposes of the statute.198 Furthermore, the Court emphasized 
the importance of releases to the administration of FELA.199 This latter point 
is related to the institutional interests of federal courts just discussed. The 
federal courts are called upon to determine the validity of these releases as 
part of their administration of cases brought under FELA.200 The Court was 
pointing out that state law could not come into federal courts and disrupt the 
federal courts’ administration of the claims before it. 
This observation about the administrative aspect of waivers is 
analogous to the settlement enforcement proceeding context. For one thing, 
a settlement is functionally very similar to a waiver or release. In fact, 
settlements often include general releases of other related claims. They are 
both means of resolving litigation, one before the case is even brought and 
one after the initiation of the claim. But if waivers are important to the 
administration of a statute, then settlements are even more important given 
the prevalence of settlement as a means of resolving claims under a 
particular statute. Given all of the similarities between waivers and 
settlements, there is a compelling argument that the institutional interests of 
federal courts in controlling their dockets supports the use of federal 
common law not only with waivers, but also settlements. 
Despite being the most analogous Supreme Court case to the 
settlement context and containing a broad allowance for federal common 
law when the incidents of federal rights are involved, Dice has had limited 
influence over the past fifty years. The Supreme Court has rarely cited the 
case; when it has, the case is cited for procedural issues specific to FELA 
that are not relevant to settlements.201 Nevertheless, the case remains on the 
books with strong language in favor of federal common law should the 
Supreme Court someday face this choice of law issue.202 
 
198  See id. 
199  Id. 
200  Id. 
201  See, e.g., Hogue v. S. Ry. Co., 390 U.S. 516, 517 (1968) (per curiam) (holding that federal rather 
than state law controls the issue of whether under FELA a plaintiff must tender back consideration 
received for a release when alleging a mistake of act regarding that release in a lawsuit). 
202  Some of the more expansive statements from Dice clearly are no longer valid given the modern 
shift against federal common law. For one, Dice takes the position that because states could undermine 
the federal right to sue created by FELA, federal law controls the validity of waivers. See Dice, 342 U.S. 
at 361. But under the modern understanding of the role of federal common law, the abstract possibility 
that a federal policy or interest could be undermined by state rule is not enough. A specific state rule that 
presents a significant conflict is required before federal common law is justified. See Atherton v. FDIC, 
519 U.S. 213, 223 (1997); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994). Additionally, the Dice 
Court invoked the need for “uniform application throughout the country” as a justification for the use of 
federal common law, but did not actually analyze the issue. See Dice, 342 U.S. at 361. Under Atherton 
and O’Melveny, however, the need for uniformity has to be affirmatively established rather than 
assumed. 
That being said, we have already seen that the settlement enforcement setting with the federal 
interests it implicates can meet these modern standards. Since Dice remains good law, should this issue 
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The Fourth Circuit has recognized the institutional interest of the 
federal courts in controlling settlements, though Dice has not been broadly 
extended to settlement enforcement proceedings. Specifically, the court in 
Gamewell Manufacturing, Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc. considered whether 
federal or state law would control the enforceability of a settlement 
agreement of patent infringement claims.203 The court cited Dice204 but 
declined to rely on it, instead resolving the choice of law issue on the 
premise that “federal procedural interests” in determining whether and 
when settlement has been achieved in federal litigation were sufficient to 
justify the creation of a federal rule on the issue.205 While the Fourth Circuit 
has not relied on the Gamewell case in its recent settlement enforcement 
cases,206 a return to respecting the institutional interests of federal courts 
would allow the courts the freedom to efficiently manage their affairs. 
But it is not enough to say that there is a federal interest in the federal 
courts managing themselves. To justify the use of federal common law, 
there must be a significant conflict with that interest created by using state 
law.207 With respect to the federal interest in federal court independence, 
however, the conflict is quite apparent. Requiring the use of state law in 
settlement enforcement proceedings creates a fundamental conflict because 
to do so would amount to a substantial interference with the federal courts’ 
autonomy by requiring federal courts to apply the law of fifty different 
states. It would be a significant conflict with the nature of the federal court 
system. 
Furthermore, mandating that the federal courts administer settlements 
pursuant to the vagaries and inconsistencies of the laws of different states 
creates unnecessary inefficiency. The inefficiencies extend not only to the 
judges tasked with presiding over a wide variety of settlements; individual 
litigants are also negatively affected. Settlements are an increasingly 
important aspect of the vindication of federal rights. Since so much of 
federal litigation revolves around the process of negotiating a settlement, 
the rules governing those settlements will shape how litigants interact with 
each other and how courts interact with the litigants. For these rules to vary 
from courthouse to courthouse, and even from case to case before a single 
 
ever reach the Supreme Court, the Court would have an existing opinion permitting federal common law 
in a situation highly analogous to settlement. 
203  715 F.2d 112, 113–14 (4th Cir. 1983). 
204  Id. at 114. While the court cited Dice, it did not rely on Dice or determine whether Dice 
controlled; rather, the Gamewell court found a separate basis for using federal law. 
205  Id. at 115–16. 
206  See Moore v. Beaufort Cnty., N.C., 936 F.2d 159, 162 (4th Cir. 1991); Piver v. Pender Cnty. Bd. 
of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1083 (4th Cir. 1987). But see Silicon Image, Inc. v. Genesis Microchip, Inc., 
271 F. Supp. 2d 840, 848 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding that federal law controlled a settlement enforcement 
proceeding where the underlying claim was a patent infringement action and citing Gamewell as 
controlling authority). 
207  See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218–19. 
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judge,208 leads to unnecessary confusion and inconsistency. The independent 
and self-regulating nature of the federal courts justifies the use of federal 
common law to avoid these ill effects. These problems go to the heart of the 
federal judiciary and thus the federal government. In fact, since this conflict 
with state law directly affects the basic operation of the courts, its 
significance is even more pronounced than the tort liability of federal 
contractors, a potential conflict with federal interests that the Supreme 
Court deemed significant enough to support the creation of federal common 
law.209 The importance of the uniform rules is recognized in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which establish uniform federal rules for 
pleadings, discovery, motions, and trial rather than looking to state law.210 
In light of these basic conflicts with using state law, the most effective 
remedy would be to implement a uniform federal common law governing 
settlements. It is hard to imagine that a federal judge overseeing a federal 
lawsuit would have to engage in a choice of law analysis and then apply 
different (and inconsistent) state laws every time he or she was either 
assisting in the settling of cases or adjudicating a dispute regarding those 
settlements. Since the use of state law is antithetical to the federal interest 
that the federal courts have in controlling their own courtrooms and 
dockets, the only viable solution is for courts to use federal common law, 
for Congress to adopt a statute, or to add a section on settlement to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.211 
It is important to note that this argument for uniform federal rules is 
not a general appeal to uniformity for uniformity’s sake—“that most 
generic (and lightly invoked) of alleged federal interests.”212 Federal courts 
critically assess claims for the need of a uniform federal rule213 and “reject 
generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that 
adopting state law would adversely affect” the federal interest.214 Here, the 
 
208  A single federal judge with a diverse docket could easily have diversity cases in front of it 
governed by the law of different states where, applying state law to settlement enforcement proceedings, 
different rules would apply. Compare TEX. R. CIV. P. 11 (“Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no 
agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in 
writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and 
entered of record.”), with Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(explaining how “[t]he enforceability of oral settlements is . . . the general rule, not something peculiar 
to Illinois though it has been changed by statute or court rule in some states” (citations omitted)). 
209  See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–06 (1988). 
210  The only area in which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defer to state procedure is in the 
execution of judgments. FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a). 
211  The purpose of this Article is to propose several solutions to the problem currently confronting 
the federal courts. Whether an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be possible 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006), which states that “rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right,” is beyond the scope of this Article. 
212  O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994). 
213  See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1997). 
214  United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979). 
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uniform rule serves the institutional interests of the federal courts; the 
interest at stake is the institutional interest in the autonomy of federal 
courts. Uniformity is simply the means to best protect this interest and 
should not be confused with the interest itself. 
Nor can one make the argument that the federal courts have thrived 
despite having to use state law for disputes concerning the settlement of 
federal claims. This was the argument that the Supreme Court used to reject 
the claim of a significant conflict in Atherton: the banking system has 
thrived despite varying rules pertaining to corporate governance.215 But in 
the settlement enforcement context, the conflict with the institutional 
interests of the federal courts is not simply a matter of efficiency. The 
federal courts are accorded independence in our government to handle their 
own procedures and dockets.216 Thus, whether or not the federal courts are 
“thriving” (however one might assess such a concept) is irrelevant—the 
conflict exists without reference to the functioning of the courts. In 
Atherton, the Court used the success of the banking industry to defeat 
claims for the need for uniformity in laws governing the liability of bank 
officers.217 But in the settlement context this argument is not simply for 
uniformity for uniformity’s sake, as discussed in the preceding paragraph. 
To be sure, there is an efficiency facet to the institutional interests of the 
federal courts. It is hard to argue that the federal courts would not greatly 
benefit from simplification of the settlement process. Any person familiar 
with the federal court system, even on a superficial level, is aware of the 
crowded dockets that federal judges face. Giving judges a uniform federal 
common law of settlements to deal with the settlement of all federal law 
claims would help relieve the burden on the federal court system. That 
being said, it is the independence of the courts in overseeing their own 
affairs that is the primary basis for instituting federal common law, with the 
gains in efficiency being an ancillary (but significant) benefit.218 
B. Protecting the Federal Interest in Encouraging Settlements on a  
Rule-by-Rule Basis 
The second federal interest that supports the use of federal common 
law in settlement enforcement proceedings is the federal policy of 
promoting settlement of the cases before them. The Alternative Dispute 
Resolution statute embodies a very strong federal interest in the process of 
settlement and in the promotion of settlement as a means of resolving 
 
215  Atherton, 519 U.S. at 220. 
216  See U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing that the judiciary is a separate and co-equal branch of 
government); see also §§ 2071–2077 (establishing the rulemaking authority of the Supreme Court). 
These statutes reflect that courts should control what happens before them, with some congressional 
oversight. 
217  Atherton, 519 U.S. at 220. 
218  See, e.g., §§ 2071–2077. 
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litigation.219 That statute requires that all federal district courts “devise and 
implement [their] own alternative dispute resolution program . . . to 
encourage and promote the use of alternative dispute resolution in [their] 
district[s].”220 Courts that had such programs in effect at the time the statute 
was enacted were to assess the effectiveness of the programs and improve 
them to be consistent with the statute.221 
In addition, it is well recognized among the federal courts that there is 
a strong policy in favor of settlements.222 Settlements are encouraged 
because of the benefits realized in both judicial economy through the 
clearing of increasingly crowded dockets and in the expense saved by 
litigants.223 For this reason, a federal court can direct parties in civil 
litigation to attend a settlement conference224 and sanction attorneys or 
parties for failure to obey such an order.225 Furthermore, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 408, which holds that offers to settle and statements made during 
settlement negotiations are inadmissible in court, was created to promote 
the public policy in favor of resolving disputes.226 
There are a number of significant conflicts with the federal interest in 
promoting settlements that potentially arise if state law is used in enforcing 
settlements. Unlike the institutional interest discussed above, however, the 
interest in promoting settlement cannot support uniform federal rules for 
every settlement issue that might arise in an enforcement proceeding. 
Instead, state law conflicts with the federal interest in settlements on a rule-
by-rule basis. The next subsection will discuss a number of important areas 
where state variation on important contract principles arguably encumbers 
the settlement process in the federal courts. 
1. Potential Conflicts Between State Contract Law and the Federal 
Policy of Promoting Settlement.—The well-recognized interest in 
 
219  See id. §§ 651–658. 
220  Id. § 651(b). 
221  Id. § 651(c). 
222  See, e.g., GET, LLC v. City of Blackwell, 407 F. App’x 307, 318 (10th Cir. 2011); Flex-Foot, 
Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting the “compelling public interest and 
policy in upholding and enforcing settlement agreements” and thereby “fostering judicial economy” 
(quoting Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350 (Fed. Cir. 1988))); Wilcher v. City of 
Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 372 (3d Cir. 1998) (“As a general rule, we encourage attempts to settle 
disagreements outside the litigative context.”); Stewart v. M.D.F., Inc., 83 F.3d 247, 252 (8th Cir. 1996). 
223  See, e.g., Stewart, 83 F.3d at 252 (“The judicial policy favoring settlement rests on the 
opportunity to conserve judicial resources . . . .” (citation omitted)); Ahern v. Cent. Pac. Freight Lines, 
846 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The Ninth Circuit is firmly ‘committed to the rule that the law favors 
and encourages compromise settlements. [T]here is an overriding public interest in settling and quieting 
litigation.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. McInnes, 556 F 2d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 
1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
224  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5). 
225  See, e.g., Guillory v. Domtar Indus. Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1334–35 (5th Cir. 1996). 
226  See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s notes. 
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promoting settlement of federal claims requires protection on a rule-by-rule 
basis. State contract law principles potentially restrict settlements and thus 
conflict with that policy. This necessitates that federal courts remain 
vigilant when asked to enforce settlement agreements, ensuring that 
whatever state laws they would apply to the settlements do not actually 
present such a conflict. Where they do, the court should apply a federal 
common law rule that aligns with the federal policy favoring settlements. 
Several variations in state law and conflicts between state and federal 
contract law will readily affect settlement enforcement disputes. One 
example is the validity of oral settlements. Several states deny the validity 
of oral settlements,227 while most states228 and federal common law229 hold 
that oral settlements are enforceable. It is hard to imagine an issue more 
basic to the process of settlement and the agreements resulting from that 
process than whether agreements must be in writing. The federal courts 
should determine which of these positions is most consistent with the 
federal policy of promoting settlements or a federal rule of civil procedure 
should be adopted to embrace one rule. 
Authority to settle is another rule, central to settlements, on which 
jurisdictions differ. The states vary widely on issues of when an attorney 
has authority to settle and the scope of that authority, including: (1) creating 
a rebuttable presumption that an attorney has express authority to settle,230 
 
227  See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 11 (“Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement between 
attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed 
with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record.”); 
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 671 So. 2d 315, 317–18 (La. 1996) (holding that under Louisiana law, in order for a 
settlement to be valid, it must be recited in open court or reduced to writing); Melucci v. Berthod, 
687 A.2d 878, 879 (R.I. 1997) (per curiam) (same, under Rhode Island law). 
228  See, e.g., Dillard v. Starcon Int’l, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2007) (Illinois law); Yuen v. 
Bank of China, 151 F. App’x 106, 107 (3d Cir. 2005) (New Jersey law); see also Lynch, Inc. v. 
SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The enforceability of oral settlements is . . . the 
general rule, not something peculiar to Illinois, though it has been changed by statute or court rule in 
some states.” (citations omitted)). 
229  See Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 246 F.3d 11, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2001). 
230  See, e.g., Amin v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 951 F.2d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (applying federal 
common law and concluding that “[a]n attorney retained for litigation purposes is presumed to possess 
express authority to enter into a settlement agreement on behalf of the client, and the client bears the 
burden of rebutting this presumption with affirmative proof that the attorney lacked settlement 
authority”); Villanueva v. CNA Ins. Cos., 868 F.2d 684, 686 (5th Cir. 1989) (“In Louisiana, attorneys 
are presumed to have authority to negotiate settlement agreements for their clients. Absent evidence that 
the client’s consent was not clear and express, the agreement is binding.” (citation omitted)); Clark v. 
City of Zebulon, 156 F.R.D. 684, 692 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (“It is clear that under Georgia law, an attorney 
has apparent authority to enter into settlement agreements on behalf of his client. Therefore, in the 
absence of knowledge of express restrictions on an attorney’s authority, other settling parties may 
enforce settlement agreements made by an attorney as against his client.” (citation omitted)). 
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(2) requiring express authority,231 (3) requiring authority to settle to be 
conferred in writing,232 (4) allowing a client to give his lawyer apparent 
authority through communication with opposing counsel,233 and 
(5) requiring clear and convincing evidence of express, actual authority.234 
Much like whether a party can make a binding oral settlement, 
knowing who has the authority to settle a case and the scope of that 
authority are fundamental issues to the law of settlements. On one extreme 
is the rule that attorneys are presumed to have the authority to settle a 
case.235 On the opposite extreme is the Hawaii rule that requires express 
written consent before an attorney can settle a case.236 A federal court could 
conclude that one of the rules that fall somewhere in between these two 
extremes does not rise to the level of a significant conflict with the federal 
policy in favor of settlement. However, the Hawaii rule and other more 
extreme rules may create a conflict that rises to that level. In the same way 
that courts use a uniform rule for pleading or discovery, the issues of 
authority to settle and whether settlement must be in writing are 
fundamental and require a uniform rule. 
A third example of an issue that can arise in settlement enforcements is 
the standard of proof required to rescind an agreement based on fraud or 
mutual mistake. Illinois law, for example, requires clear and convincing 
evidence to rescind a settlement on the basis of fraud or mutual mistake.237 
Not all states, however, require that the evidence be clear and convincing in 
order to rescind.238 A state rule that more readily justifies rescission of a 
settlement by reason of mutual mistake may conflict with the federal policy 
in favor of settlement of federal claims. While this scenario may arise less 
 
231  See, e.g., Jago v. Special Needs Home Health Care, 190 S.W.3d 352, 353 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“The law is clear that express client authority must be had to enter into a settlement agreement, and 
apparent authority is insufficient.”). 
232  See Cook v. Surety Life Ins., Co., 903 P.2d 708, 714 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995) (“[N]o practitioner 
shall have power to compromise, arbitrate, or settle such matters confided to the practitioner, unless 
upon special authority in writing from the practitioner’s client.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 605-7 (LexisNexis 1985))). 
233  See, e.g., Farris v. JC Penney Co., 176 F.3d 706, 712 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Pennsylvania law 
and concluding that apparent authority can be created by a client’s communication with opposing 
counsel). 
234  See, e.g., Linardos v. Lilley, 590 So. 2d 1064, 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam) 
(requiring a “clear and unequivocal grant of authority to appellant’s attorney to settle this case” as a 
precondition to enforcing purported settlement (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
235  See supra text accompanying note 230. 
236  See supra text accompanying note 232. 
237  See Dunlap v. Chi. Osteopathic Hosp., No. 92-3813, 1995 WL 94876, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar. 7, 
1995). 
238  See, e.g., Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buckallew, 685 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) 
(applying Michigan contract law to a claim for rescission of a settlement agreement and analyzing the 
issue without reference to a clear and convincing standard, but citing cases that require “satisfactory 
evidence,” such as Jackson v. Fitzgerald, 67 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Mich. 1954)). 
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frequently than the previous two, it shows how even small and generally 
unanticipated legal rules that settlements can implicate can negatively affect 
the federal policy in favor of settlement. 
This discussion only examines cases where rules currently in place 
may conflict. But federal courts are not limited to picking between an 
existing state contract law and the federal common law of contracts as it 
currently exists. Provided a significant conflict exists,239 and because federal 
policy is at stake, a federal court could create entirely new federal common 
law principles that are even more attentive to the federal interest, or a 
federal rule could be adopted which would eliminate potential 
inconsistencies among courts attempting to create the federal common law. 
2. What Is a Significant Conflict?.—While settlement rules can 
clearly conflict with the federal policy of promoting settlements, it is less 
clear when a conflict between a federal policy or interest and the use of a 
state rule of decision reaches the level of significance necessary to justify 
the use of federal common law. Based on how courts have analyzed the 
issue, there is no hard and fast answer. The analysis is highly specific to the 
federal interest at stake and the way the challenged state rule affects that 
interest. In many cases, there simply is a conflict or there is not, and there is 
not a principle that can be generalized to future cases.240 Nevertheless, a 
couple of principles can be gleaned from some of the cases addressing 
significant conflict claims. If the federal interest at stake is adequately 
protected through other legal rules, the court may find the displacement of 
state law unnecessary.241 The court may also find a federal common law rule 
unnecessary where such a rule could not protect the federal interest any 
more than state law rules can.242 
One example of a situation in which federal common law was not 
required to protect identifiable federal interests is seen in Museum of Fine 
Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, where a museum brought an action for a 
declaratory judgment that the defendant’s claims to a piece of art in its 
collection were time-barred.243 The defendant was claiming a right to the 
artwork because the Nazi German regime forced her family to sell it.244 The 
significant conflict analysis revolved around the defendant’s argument that 
the court should displace the state law statute of limitations that would bar 
the defendant’s claims to the art with a federal common law laches 
 
239  See Ciaramella v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 131 F.3d 320, 322–23 (2d Cir. 1997). 
240  See, e.g., Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2009) (identifying a 
direct conflict between state and federal law regarding the authorization of the transfer of a copyright 
license, but not analyzing “significance” in a less direct conflict). 
241  See Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2010). 
242  See, e.g., Mason & Dixon Intermodal, Inc. v. Lapmaster Int’l LLC, 632 F.3d 1056, 1062–63 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
243  623 F.3d at 3. 
244  Id. at 2. 
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defense.245 The defendant argued that there was a compelling federal 
interest in ensuring charitable organizations such as the Museum provide 
the public with the benefits for which their tax exemptions were granted.246 
The defendant argued that museums such as the plaintiff had failed to 
investigate the artwork they acquired and thus had undermined the basis for 
their tax exemption by facilitating commerce in stolen artwork.247 As a 
result, the defendant argued, the federal courts are justified in using federal 
common law in lawsuits seeking to reclaim Nazi-confiscated artworks. 
The First Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that there was a 
significant conflict with federal policies concerning tax exempt 
organizations that required the use of federal common law in that instance. 
The court reasoned that there were many other means through which tax-
exempt organizations were made accountable to the public interest. For one, 
they are subject to state law, such as employment law and fiduciary duties, 
the latter of which would protect against accusations such as the ones the 
defendant made.248 Additionally, an organization may lose its tax-exempt 
status should it shirk its duties and be subject to criminal and civil penalties 
for various other abuses.249 The court concluded that “[t]he federal interest 
in ensuring that tax-exempt organizations ‘demonstrably serve and be in 
harmony with the public interest’ is adequately protected through these 
mechanisms and others.”250 As a result, no further federal common law rules 
were necessary to protect the federal interest in tax exempt organizations.251 
Thus, there was a recognized federal interest to protect, but the court 
determined that alternate protection was in place via state law and other 
mechanisms. 
The argument that there is not a significant conflict because the federal 
interest at issue is adequately protected in other ways does not apply to the 
settlement enforcement context. There is no alternative scheme that protects 
the federal interest in encouraging settlements. The real threat against the 
settlement of cases comes not from the actions of individuals (putting aside 
obstinate litigants), but from rules and procedures that undermine 
settlement. Nothing other than contract rules related to settlement 
agreements are capable of upholding the federal interest in promoting 
settlements because these are the rules that determine whether there is a 
settlement. Nor can one say that state contract law will adequately provide 
an alternate protective scheme to the interest in settlements. For all of the 
contract rules on which the states vary, one rule must, as a matter of federal 
 
245  Id. at 6. 
246  Id. at 10. 
247  Id. 
248  Id. 
249  Id. at 11. 
250  Id. (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983)). 
251  Id. 
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policy, best support the settlement of federal claims. For example, regarding 
the validity of oral settlements, federal courts should embrace the rule that 
they find to be protective of the interest in settling federal claims. Leaving 
state law to determine the validity of settlements of federal claims simply 
leaves the law in its current problematic state. Therefore, the alternate 
protection basis of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, which meant that federal 
common law was not required to protect the particular federal interest, is 
inapplicable to the significant conflict analysis in the settlement context. 
In settlement enforcement proceedings, there may well be certain 
contract principles that will not have an impact on the federal interest in 
promoting settlements one way or the other. In such circumstances, the use 
of federal common law as the rule of decision would not be justified. An 
example of this would be where a court was asked to interpret a specific 
term in the settlement agreement. Regardless of what the court takes that 
term to mean, it will not cause there to be more or fewer settlements. For 
example, courts vary on how they interpret provisions for the payment of 
costs when they are included in settlement agreements.252 But regardless of 
how a settlement dispute about such a term would be resolved by a court, it 
would not promote or hinder the federal policy in favor of settlements. On 
the other hand, the issues discussed above, particularly in the area of 
contract formation, such as the authority to settle and the validity of oral 
settlement, certainly will have the possibility of hindering the federal policy 
in favor of settlements. Therefore, rules pertaining to these issues are 
capable of creating a significant conflict with that policy and are ripe for 
federal common law rules. 
C. Federal Common Law Control of Settlements on a  
Statute-by-Statute Analysis 
Even if the arguments for across-the-board use of federal law failed,253 
there would still be arguments to be made for each individual federal statute 
based on the policies and interests implicated by that specific statute. This 
was the approach taken by the Second Circuit in Ciaramella.254 When the 
defendant–appellee urged the court to fashion a federal common law rule 
finding a binding oral settlement whenever the parties’ attorneys agreed on 
all material terms, the court’s significant conflict analysis focused on the 
specific underlying statutes.255 The court did not address any broader federal 
interest in settlements of federal claims in general, whether premised on 
uniformity or simply the policy of encouraging settlements. The court 
looked at both the ADA and ERISA, finding in the ADA an explicit policy 
 
252  See generally Wade R. Habeeb, Construction of Provision, in Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement, for Payment of Costs as Part of Settlement, 71 A.L.R.3d 909 (1976). 
253  See supra Part II.A. 
254  Ciaramella v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 131 F.3d 320, 323 (2d Cir. 1997). 
255  See id. at 322–23. 
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in favor of voluntary settlement.256 The defendant–appellee’s argument 
failed where the state law and existing federal common law rule257 did not 
actually conflict with this federal policy.258 
As Ciaramella demonstrates, the analysis under this statute-by-statute 
approach would vary depending on the specific source of the federal 
lawsuit. Arguments would be based on the specific language and legislative 
histories of the individual statute at stake in that case and would therefore 
be hard to anticipate. One form this argument might take mirrors that in 
Ciaramella, that the specific statute—the ADA in that case—encourages 
voluntary settlements.259 Another federal statute with an identifiable policy 
in favor of settlement is Title VII.260 
There may also be other statute-specific policies that would be 
threatened by the use of state law to interpret settlement agreements. For 
any given federal statute, there could potentially be some unique policy or 
interest advanced by that particular statute that requires that federal law 
control all settlements under that statute. To hold otherwise would expose 
those policies and interests to possible erosion by the states.261 Such a 
rationale has been recognized by at least one court as possibly applying to 
any federal remedial statute created to rectify historical inequalities in 
bargaining power, such as racial minorities under § 1983 or employees 
subject to discrimination under Title VII.262 If federal common law found 
valid settlements in situations where state contract law would not (in the 
context of oral settlement agreements, for example), such a conflict could 
result in a party being adversely affected by the use of state law in 
settlement of federal question claims. A federal court would be justified in 
creating a federal common law rule to supplant any state law rule that 
served to upset the protections or remedies envisioned by a federal statute. 
Even if the Supreme Court were to conclude that the institutional 
interests of the federal courts do not justify the blanket use of federal 
 
256  Id. at 323. 
257  The court declined to choose which one controlled in that case because there was no material 
difference between the two rules. Id. 
258  Id. 
259  Id. 
260  See Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981) (9–0 decision) (“In enacting Title 
VII, Congress expressed a strong preference for encouraging voluntary settlement of employment 
discrimination claims.”). 
261  See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952). As discussed supra 
notes 28–33 and accompanying text, Dice held that federal rights protected by FELA could be eroded if 
states were allowed to determine available defenses and also noted the importance of uniform 
application of a federal statute. Dice, 342 U.S. at 361–62. 
262  See Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112, 114–15 (4th Cir. 1983). The 
Gamewell court implicitly equates presuit waivers of federal claims with settlements of federal claims in 
its analysis. The Supreme Court case it bases its argument on is Dice, 342 U.S. at 361. See supra notes 
28–33 and accompanying text. 
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common law in settlement enforcement disputes where the underlying 
claim arose under federal law, federal interests demand consideration in 
settlement agreements. There may be statute-specific policies that require 
applying federal common law. A federal court must weigh these interests, 
and the various threats to them presented by state law, when deciding 
whether a federal common law rule is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, federal common law should 
only displace state law where there is a significant conflict between the use 
of state law and a federal policy or interest. The federal courts have a 
clearly identifiable institutional interest in managing their own procedures 
and dockets. This interest can be deduced from the federal courts’ broad 
powers to set the procedures governing all aspects of litigation as it unfolds 
both within and outside the courtroom. Supreme Court precedent permitting 
the use of federal common law on issues related to in-court procedures 
further supports this federal interest. Any time a settlement stemming from 
a federal claim is before a federal judge, that judge should not have to parse 
through different legal rules or choice of law principles. A uniform federal 
common law of settlements in this situation should be adopted. 
Additionally, there is a clearly identifiable federal interest in promoting 
settlements widely recognized by the federal courts and embodied by the 
federal Alternative Dispute Resolution statute. The undeniable federal 
policy in favor of settlement demands that federal courts conduct a case-by-
case inquiry each time a settlement enforcement dispute is before them to 
ensure that the state rule at issue does not significantly conflict with that 
federal policy. This issue will likely have a significant conflict, particularly 
in the areas of oral settlements and authority to settle. Federal courts should 
not permit state contract rules that place restrictions on settlements to 
undermine the interest in the resolution of federal claims. Additionally, 
there may be statute-specific federal interests that require the use of federal 
law in settlements of claims brought under those statutes. 
Recognition by federal courts of the various federal interests at stake in 
settlement enforcement proceedings will lead to much needed stability in 
this ever-important area of law. Given the prevalence of settlements in our 
civil litigation system, the rules that govern the disputes that inevitably arise 
from the settlement process are of paramount importance. Federal courts 
confronted with settlement enforcement disputes should apply federal 
common law. An efficient and direct route to the necessary uniformity 
would be to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to add a section on 
settlement, though the Article acknowledges potential challenges for this 
possibility.263 In the meantime, practitioners can minimize confusion by 
 
263  See supra note 18. 
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including choice of law provisions in their settlement agreements. It is time 
that federal courts realize that the choice of law decisions that they 
presently rely on do not accurately reflect current Supreme Court doctrine. 
Once they pass this hurdle, they can ensure that the federal interests 
impacted by settlements of federal claims are adequately protected by 
adopting and implementing a federal common law of settlements for all 
federal question cases. 
 
